[Download] "Returning Foreign Fighters to Tunisia and Libya After the Conflict in Iraq and Syria: Case Studies and Network Analysis Highlights Groups Likely to Receive Islamic State ISIS Returnee Fighters" by Progressive Management # Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Returning Foreign Fighters to Tunisia and Libya After the Conflict in Iraq and Syria: Case Studies and Network Analysis Highlights Groups Likely to Receive Islamic State ISIS Returnee Fighters
- Author : Progressive Management
- Release Date : January 07, 2019
- Genre: Military,Books,History,Politics & Current Events,Political Science,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 2064 KB
Description
This late 2018 report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Many of the fighters who traveled from their home states in Africa and Europe have begun to return as the Islamic State (IS) has lost control over much of the territory it seized in Iraq and Syria. These returnees are not only fighters; they are also family members or individuals who supported the organization indirectly. As estimated by Richard Barrett in Beyond the Caliphate, a minimum of 5,600 individuals have returned home to 33 countries around the world as of October 2017. Some of them have chosen to return to under-governed states rather than their nation of origin to connect with and gain support from Salafi-Jihadist networks or to escape punishment in their home states that have implemented strict policies of judicial punishment for IS and its supporters. Returnees are perceived as a significant threat both due to their battlefield experience and their ability to strengthen existing networks and to increase convergence of disconnected or loosely connected networks in the region. This thesis examines governments, political parties, and extremist organizations via case study and network analysis to highlight which groups are most likely to receive returning fighters and to determine if their policies are likely to strengthen or weaken their ties to extremism upon their return.
This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
I. Introduction * A. Scope * B. Research Questions * C. Focus on Tunisia and Libya * D. Who Are the Foreign Fighters? * E. Historical Context * F. Returning Home * G. State Responses to Returning Foreign Fighters * H. What is Missing? * I. Methodology * 1. Macro Level — Case Studies * 2. Micro Level — Zignal, Gephi, and Social Network Analysis (SNA) * II. Tunisia * A. Introduction * B. Background * C. Returnees * D. Grievances and Conditions That Contribute to the Decision to Support Salafi-Jihadism * E. Push and Pull Factors: Tunisia as a "Push" State * F. Who Will Receive Returning Foreign Fighters? * 1. The Tunisian Government * 2. Western Insurgency * 3. Political Parties * 4. Ansar al-Sharia (AST) * G. Tunisian Policy * H. Political Fragility * I. Predictions * J. Conclusion * III. Libya * A. Introduction * B. Background * 1. Political History * C. Current Politics * D. Who Will Receive Foreign Fighters and Their Supporters * 1. Presidency Council and the Government of National Accord (GNA) * 2. High Council of State — a.k.a GNC — Tripoli * 3. House of Representatives (HoR) — Grand Marshal Haftar * E. Extremist Organizations * 1. Is * 2. Asl * 3. Convergence of Threat Groups in Face of a Mutual Threat * F. Policy for Returnees * G. Conclusions * IV. Social Network Analysis of the Context of ISIS Returnees * A. Introduction * 1. Initial Data Set * 2. Narrowing the Data * 3. Modularity Clusters * B. Conclusions * V. Conclusions
Many of the fighters who traveled from their home states in Africa and Europe have begun to return as the Islamic State (IS) has lost control over much the territory it seized territory in Iraq and Syria. The amount of territory held by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its immediate predecessors peaked in 2015 and has been contracting. These returnees are not only fighters but also include families or individuals who supported the organization indirectly. An estimated minimum of 5,600 individuals have returned home to 33 countries around the world as of October 2017. Some of these may choose to return to under-governed states different than their nation of origin to connect with and gain support from Salafi-Jihadist or criminal networks or merely as a means to escape punishment in their home states who have implemented strict policies of judicial punishment for IS and its supporters.